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Abstract 
Within the literature, there is an ongoing debate on how to understand the broader 
implications of the process of electoral dealignment. While some authors argue that 
dealignment leads to a more ‘open’ electorate that ponders the options offered by the party 
system, other authors have argued that dealignment leads to a general alienation from the 
party system. In this article, we investigate the relation between partisanship, indifference 
towards political parties, and alienation from the party system, based on an analysis of the 
voter surveys of the European Election Studies (EES) project, 1989-2014. The results indicate 
that dealignment is associated with indifference as well as with alienation but that the relation 
with alienation is much stronger, both on an aggregate as on an individual level. We conclude 
therefore that dealignment could pose a challenge for the legitimacy of the party system as a 
whole. 
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Introduction 
The scholarly literature points at the occurrence of a process of electoral dealignment 
among electorates in advanced industrial democracies (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002; Dalton, 
1984; Franklin et al, 2009; Särlvik and Crewe, 1983). This pattern of dealignment can be 
defined as a gradual weakening of the linkages and the affective ties between voters and 
political parties. There is quite some debate on the extent to which there is dealignment,  and 
it is equally clear that trends vary substantially from one country to another (Bafumi and 
Shapiro, 2009; Franklin et al, 2009). Nevertheless, indications of change are manifold and 
accumulating, and even the most sanguine defenders of a thesis of stability and continuity in 
Western European politics have started to report evidence of flux in electoral behaviour in 
European democracies (Mair, 2002). In sum, it seems that a process of dealignment is indeed 
present and affecting voting behavior in advanced democracies. Indications are that voting 
has become more volatile, that split ticket voting has increased and that institutionalized 
political participation has declined (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002). 
While there is mounting evidence substantiating the claim that dealignment is taking 
place, there is an ongoing debate about how exactly this process should be conceptualized, 
and what are its potential consequences. The point of departure is that traditionally ‘aligned’ 
electorates can be considered as closed for new competitors. If partisanship has a very strong 
effect, this implies that for most voters there is not all that much leeway to consider voting for 
other parties, as they are strongly attached to their initially preferred party. Within this 
context, new political parties face an uphill struggle if they want to acquire a market share in 
such a closed electorate. So while we know how an ‘aligned’ or closed electorate looks like, 
there are two options to understand the process of dealignment (Rose and McAllister, 1986). 
The first possibility is that the closed shop system has given way to truly open electoral 
competition, where an increasingly large part of the electorate is open to be persuaded by the 
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messages of new political parties and parties they did not support in previous elections. If we 
conceptualize dealignment as an opening up of traditionally solidly anchored electoral 
loyalties, there is no reason to assume that the electorate’s attitude towards the party system as 
a whole would necessarily change: one preferred party can simply be exchanged for varying 
preferences from one election to another. According to a second theoretical perspective, 
however, dealignment implies an alienation of citizens from the entire party system. The fact 
that there no longer is a single preferred party, would imply that all that is left is a negative, 
depreciative attitude that extends towards all political parties. This distinction between closed, 
open and alienated electorates is powerfully evoked by Rose and McAllister (1986: 156): “In 
a closed electorate, voters would only endorse positive remarks about their own party; in an 
open electorate they could find something good to say about more than one party. In an 
alienated electorate, nothing good would be said about any of the parties.” 
It is quite striking to note, however, that there is not all that much empirical research 
investigating this distinction between closed, open and alienated electorates. While it seems 
clear that the bonds between voters and their most preferred party are becoming weaker, it 
does remain an open question whether this leads to an open, or rather to an alienated 
electorate. Apartisans were originally portrayed as politically uninvolved citizens (Campbell 
et al, 1960) and recent publications still show that independents and apartisans are less 
involved and interested in politics and have lower levels of political knowledge (Albright, 
2009; Dassonneville et al, 2012). These findings suggest that dealignment in practice equals 
political alienation, since an increase in the number of independents in the electorate – as a 
result of dealignment – is thought to reflect increasing levels of political alienation. However, 
Dalton (1984, 2013) has argued that the new dealigned voter that enters the electorate 
represents the ancient ideal of an independent citizen, who weighs in an independent manner 
the pros and cons associated with the positions of every political party s/he could vote for. 
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The expectation within this line of the literature is that the growth in the number of apartisans 
in the electorate results in more ‘open’ electorates, with truly informed vote choices being 
cast on Election Day (Dalton, 2013).  
The main ambition of this article is to develop a rigorous empirical test shedding light 
on the question whether dealignment is associated with the surge of either an open or an 
alienated electorate. An open electorate would imply that dealigned voters indeed have a 
realistic possibility to switch from one party to another, as their utility functions do not differ 
all that much between parties. An alienated electorate on the other hand would imply that 
when the strong propensity to vote for one preferred party is lost, the end result is a negative 
attitude towards all political parties. Investigating these different dimensions of electoral 
dealignment, with a focus on the distinction between openness and alienation, has important 
normative and theoretical consequences. An open electorate responds more closely to the 
classical democratic ideal, as this implies that citizens will consider the various options being 
offered by the party system. An alienated electorate, on the other hand, could be an indication 
for a lack of democratic legitimacy, which could have adverse consequences for democratic 
stability. 
In the remainder of this article, we first explain more in detail why it is important to 
introduce a distinction between openness and alienation. Subsequently we operationalize both 
concepts, before we present data and methods. The next section gives an overview of the 
results and we end with some concluding thoughts on the implications of our findings. 
 
Dealignment, alienation and indifference 
Over the past decades, voting behaviour in democracies in Western-Europe has altered 
fundamentally. The stable bonds between voters and parties have eroded through a process of 
dealignment, and this process as well as the changes in voting behaviour it instigates are by 
  5 
now well documented (Walczak et al, 2012). This is evident from the fact that the proportion 
of citizens that feels strongly attached to a particular political party decreases (Clarke and 
Stewart, 1998; Crewe et al, 1977; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002; Denver and Garnett, 2014; 
Dalton, 2013; Schmitt, 2009), from the observation that turnout and party membership figures 
are in decline (Franklin, 2004; Hooghe and Kern, 2015; van Biezen et al, 2012), from 
indications of an increase in split-ticket voting (Dalton, 2012), the waning of class voting 
(Evans and Tilley, 2012; Franklin et al, 2009) or an increase of levels of volatility 
(Dassonneville and Hooghe, forthcoming; Pedersen, 1979). Undeniably, linkages between 
voters and parties have weakened in recent decades, and we can no longer characterize 
electorates as ‘closed’ (Rose and McAllister, 1986).  
A rather optimistic interpretation is that this process has led to an ‘opening’ up of 
electorates, allowing for the realization of a democratic ideal where voters carefully and 
independently consider alternative options instead of relying on habits, parental socialization 
or the social class they belong to when deciding what party to vote for (Dalton, 2013). Such 
an evolution is considered to positively affect representative democracy, as this ‘choosiness’ 
from the part of voters “encourages politicians to pay more attention to the views of the 
electorate” (Rose and McAllister, 1986: 162). Some empirical findings offer suggestive 
evidence for such a pattern, with apartisans making vote choices that appear ‘truly’ informed 
(Dalton, 2013).  Walczak and her colleagues (2012), for example, show issues to be of more 
importance for younger and dealigned generations of voters when they decide what party to 
vote for and Jessee (2010) has shown that while partisans’ perceptions of the positions of 
candidates is biased, the vote choices of independent voters are in accordance with spatial 
voting theories. Furthermore, Kayser and Wlezien (2011) show that performance evaluations 
have a stronger impact on the vote of apartisans compared to what holds for voters with a 
partisan attachment. Tilley and Hobolt (2011) additionally present experimental evidence 
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showing that partisanship biases citizens’ attribution of responsibility as well as their 
evaluation of government performance, while apartisans are not biased. Even though 
suggestive, these findings do not shed light on whether dealignment indeed implies that voters 
are taking into consideration multiple parties when casting their vote. Even if issue voting is 
on the rise, for example, an established pattern of issue ownership within the party system 
might still imply that in practice they only consider one party that is likely to receive their 
vote. It has to be tested, therefore, whether dealignment indeed leads to the outcome that the 
differences in the expected utility outcomes of different party preferences becomes smaller, 
implying that voters are taking into consideration multiple parties when casting a vote. This 
leads to the first hypothesis – H1 – that dealignment is associated with a growing openness 
towards the options being offered by various political parties, or to phrase it differently that 
they are more indifferent toward the utility functions offered by the different parties. 
Other authors, however, are much more pessimistic about the possible implications of 
the process of dealignment. Coinciding with the process of dealignment, in a number of 
countries it has been shown that levels of political trust are declining (Dalton, 2004). 
Furthermore, cross-sectional studies have repeatedly shown that apartisans are less involved 
in politics and less satisfied with democracy (Albright, 2009; Dassonneville et al, 2012; 
Marthaler, 2008). Voters who switch parties from one election to another, too, have been 
characterized as ‘frustrated’ about and alienated from politics (Söderlund, 2008; Zelle, 1995). 
Following this line of thought, our second and competing hypothesis – H2 – would be that 
dealignment is associated with a growing alienation from political parties and the party 
system. 
The difference between alienation and indifference as dimensions of dealignment 
largely coincides with the distinction Dalton (2012, 2013) has introduced between different 
types of apartisans. There is a growing consensus that an increasing proportion of the 
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electorate in Western-European democracies can be considered as ‘apartisan’, i.e., without a 
firm party identity. According to Dalton, one can distinguish two different types of apartisans: 
the cognitively mobilized on the one hand and the apolitical on the other. Cognitively 
mobilized apartisans are choosing political parties independently from partisan cues, but they 
are still politically involved and interested in politics. Their party preferences are hence 
indifferent, as they do not have a fixed preference, but in no way these citizens are alienated 
from the party system as a whole. We use the term indifferent here in its original meaning, 
i.e., a lack of differentiation in expected utilities, no matter how high or how low this level of 
expected utilities is. The apolitical independents, by contrast, are the ones not involved in 
party politics at all and they shun any form of electoral engagement. For this group, the 
prevailing attitude should be one of alienation, with none of the parties being regarded as an 
attractive option. While we know that the group of apartisans grows larger, we do not know 
whether this group should be predominantly considered as open to multiple options, or 
predominantly as alienated from the party system. 
We argue that the best way to investigate this question is to rely on the concepts of 
indifference and alienation. These two concepts originate in a Downsian logic of party 
utilities. Spatial modelers refer to indifference and alienation as two distinct positions of 
voters vis-à-vis political parties (Anderson and Glomm, 1992; Johnston et al, 2007). First, 
indifference refers to a situation where “voters perceive little (no) difference between 
alternatives” (Aarts and Wessels, 2005: 78), implying that voters have the same or similar 
utilities to vote for multiple parties. Voters might still observe an ideological difference 
between a left or a right wing party, but if they do not have any preferences for either party, 
they are basically indifferent towards the available options. Scholars investigating the 
determinants of turnout argue that when utilities to vote for multiple parties are similar, 
citizens are less willing to pay the cost of turning out to vote (Aarts and Wessels, 2005; 
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Adams et al, 2006). Given (almost) equal preferences for multiple political parties these 
voters have no apparent incentive to turn out and vote.  
Second, alienation denotes a setting in which “both (all) alternatives in the election 
are far from the voter’s ideal point” (Aarts and Wessels, 2005: 78). A sense of alienation 
arises when citizens feel that all parties or candidates are distant from them and previous 
research has shown that this feeling as well reduces citizens’ willingness to pay the cost of 
voting and therefore decreases turnout in elections (Aarts and Wessels, 2005; Adams et al, 
2006). 
Within the literature there is some discussion about how to operationalize both 
concepts. Indifference and alienation are traditionally conceived of in terms of the distance 
between citizens and parties on one or multiple issues. Additionally, a number of scholars 
have taken a broader perspective, treating indifference and alienation as aspects of citizens’ 
perceptions of the party system itself (Aarts and Wessels, 2005; Johnston et al, 2007). It is 
this latter approach that we follow in the current paper, by focusing on citizens’ attitudes 
towards the parties at offer expressed in their propensity to vote for a specific party. More 
specifically, we want to investigate to what extent being an apartisan induces indifference 
(i.e., little difference between the preferences for different parties) or rather alienation (i.e., a 
negative attitude towards the entire party system).  
 
Data and methods 
For investigating the relation between electoral dealignment on the one hand, and 
indifference and alienation on the other we use two different analytical approaches. First, 
given that dealignment is considered a process that is developing over time, we investigate 
over-time trends in indifference and alienation and we assess descriptively the extent to which 
these trends co-occur with weakening partisan attachments. As we know dealignment is an 
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ongoing process, it is a sound strategy to investigate whether indifference or alienation follow 
the same development over time. If this is not the case, it is rendered unlikely that 
dealignment would be related to these phenomena. Second, we examine on a cross-sectional 
basis how both concepts relate to whether or not a citizen is attached to one particular political 
party, allowing us to assess to what extent apartisans are indifferent and/or alienated from the 
parties at offer. We make use of the voter survey data from the European Election Studies 
(EES) project. These data allow investigating indifference and alienation and how these two 
attitudes relate to dealignment for a broad set of West-European countries. It is in this context 
of the advanced democracies in Western Europe that the process of dealignment is argued to 
be at play most strongly (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002). Furthermore, using the combined 
EES dataset (1989-2004), supplemented with the voter surveys that were conducted during 
the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections, allows investigating changes in levels of 
indifference and alienation between 1989 and 2014. Self-evidently this combination of 
longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses does not address the question of causality, but it 
allows us to discount some relations. If we do not find any relation at all between on the one 
hand alienation or indifference, and electoral dealignment on the other, it is unlikely that there 
should be any causal relation. 
 We adopt the approach of Johnston et al (2007) for operationalizing indifference and 
alienation – conceived of as perceptions of the party system. The data sets that we analyse 
however, do not include ‘thermometer scales’, as in the original research by Johnston et al. 
Therefore, we rely on ‘propensity to vote’ (PTV)-measures, on a scale from 1 to 10, for each 
of the parties at offer.
1
 These PTV-scales allow for sufficient variance in order to investigate 
our two hypotheses. PTV-scales are closely related to thermometer and like/dislike scales, but 
they are intended to directly measure electoral utilities (van der Eijk and Marsh, 2011). This 
characteristic of PTV-scales makes them well suited for operationalizing indifference and 
  10 
alienation, and the idea of indifference and alienation as referred to by Rose and McAllister 
(1986) in particular, as those PTV-scales express the “utility that voters might derive from the 
various choices” (Johnston et al, 2007: 737). The wording of the PTV-question is: ‘We have 
a number of parties in [country] each of which would like to get your vote. How probable is it 
that you will ever vote for the following parties? Please specify your views on a 10-point-
scale where 1 means ‘not probable at all’ and 10 means ‘very probable’. 
 Adopting the operationalization of Johnston et al (2007: 737) implies that indifference 
is a measure of “how much the respondent prefers his or her favorite party over the least 
favorite one”, which is expressed as follows: 
  
Indifference =  (10 – ( max(PTVi) – min(PTVj≠i)))/10   (1)  
  
where PTVi is the rating of the i
th
 party on the 10-point scale 
 
Alienation, by contrast, is a measure of “how far the respondent is from his or her closest 
party” (Johnston et al, 2007: 737) and is expressed as: 
 
Alienation = (10 – max (PTVi))/10      (2) 
  
where PTVi is the rating of the i
th
 party on the 10-point scale 
 
Party identity is measured by means of two questions in the EES-surveys. A first 
question asks voters whether or not they feel close to a particular political party. 
Subsequently, their degree of closeness is gauged for, the options ranging from ‘merely a 
sympathizer’, ‘fairly close’ to ‘very close’. To ease the interpretation of the results, we 
include a dichotomous variable (distinguishing partisans and apartisans) in the analyses, and 
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we consider voters who report being fairly or very close to a party as partisans.
2
 As a 
limitation of the EES-data, it has to be mentioned that a change in the wording of these 
questions from 2004 onwards has led to an increase in the proportion of respondents 
mentioning being close to a particular party, preventing a longitudinal analysis of partisanship 
and its impact on alienation and indifference using the EES-data. We thus present an 
alternative approach to gain insights in changes in partisanship over time and rely on other 
data-sources to verify whether at an aggregate-level the trends in indifference and alienation 
that we observe are paralleled with a trends towards dealignment. To this end, we employ 
data from Eurobarometer; a data source scholars have previously relied on to examine the 
presence of a process of dealignment (Kayser and Wlezien, 2011; Lisi, 2015). As the 
Eurobarometer surveys no longer include a measure of partisanship after 1994, we append to 
the time series the data from the seven modules of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002-
2014). As a result, we can cover the period 1989-2014, although the series is interrupted 
between 1994 and 2002. Furthermore, as the wording of party ID questions changes within 
the Eurobarometer data (Schmitt, 1989) and between the Eurobarometer data and the ESS-
data as well (Lisi, 2015), we have to be careful when assessing the trend in these data. As a 
cautious approach, we look at the proportion of respondents indicating that they feel close to a 
party, which is in line with how Lisi (2015) has investigated trends in partisanship by means 
of a combination of Eurobarometer and ESS-data.  
While our focus is on the relation between indifference and alienation on partisanship, 
various control variables are called for in the individual-level analyses. We control for the 
impact of gender, age, religious practice and social class as well as political interest, as all of 
these background variables have been shown to be closely related to various forms of 
electoral behaviour and political attitudes. 
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 The datasets used for the analyses cover a number of different countries and 
institutional settings, but our hypotheses are situated at the individual level, which is why we 
focus on trends and effects within countries.
3
 For the explanatory analyses, we hence present 
the results of fixed effects models, allowing for a general assessment of individual-level 
effects while controlling for country-specific differences in levels of alienation and 
indifference.  
 
Results 
Change over time 
In a first step, we examine the over-time evolution of attitudes of indifference and 
alienation in the electorates of Western Europe and we compare this to trends in partisanship 
over time. Importantly, as different data sources are used, the time points at which 
partisanship on the one hand and indifference and alienation on the other are measured differ. 
As a result, we cannot estimate correlations between aggregate-level figures. Instead, we 
graphically assess time trends and to ease the interpretation of these trends, we include linear 
trend lines for each of the time series. According to our hypotheses, we should graphically 
note opposing trends (with partisanship decreasing and indifference/alienation increasing). 
We start by assessing levels of indifference, or the extent to which a voter prefers 
her/his favorite party over the least preferred party (Figure 1). Looking at the graphs, it is 
evident that there is quite some between-country variation in levels and trends of indifference 
and partisanship across Western Europe. Importantly, however, the graphs show that trends 
are in expected – opposite – directions for partisanship on the one hand and indifference on 
the other. We furthermore note the sharpest over-time increases in indifference in countries 
where partisanship has declined strongly as well (e.g., Greece or Italy). In Sweden, finally, 
which is the only country where levels of partisanship appear to be increasing, we observe a 
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trend towards decreasing levels of indifference. Clearly, the graphs suggest that dealignment 
and indifference are indeed correlated. 
Focusing on trends in indifference, we furthermore observe that mean levels of 
indifference in the 2014 election are significantly higher than in the first election examined in 
9 out of the 16 countries (see Appendix 1). Across the election samples, levels of indifference 
have increased from 0.26 in 1989 to 0.33 at the time of the 2014 European Parliament 
elections, suggesting that over the 25 years covered by our analyses, levels of indifference 
have increased by roughly one fourth.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Next, we examine levels of alienation in the election samples covered. Alienation has 
been calculated using equation (2) and hence varies between 0 and 1 as well. Looking at the 
country-specific graphs plotting the evolution of alienation and partisanship in Figure 2, it can 
be observed that in countries where partisanship has decreased most strongly, we find 
alienation to increase most strongly as well. Portugal is a clear example of these opposing 
trends. Furthermore, in countries where partisanship remains largely stable we observe levels 
of alienation to be remain fairly stable over time as well (e.g., Finland). In line with what we 
observed for indifference, we furthermore note that in the only country where levels of 
partisanship are increasing (Sweden), levels of alienation are decreasing. In sum, this 
descriptive look at trends in partisanship and alienation confirms the intuition of a correlation 
between dealignment and alienation in Western Europe.  
Looking at the trends in alienation more specifically, we find strong indications of an 
increase in alienation since 1989. There is some between-country variation in the extent to 
which levels of alienation increase, but overall, the main pattern is one of growing levels of 
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alienation – with levels of alienation being significantly higher in 2014 compared to 1989 in 
12 out of 16 countries. Across the countries, levels of alienation almost doubled from 0.12 in 
1989 to 0.19 in 2014 (see Appendix 2). 
In sum, this descriptive analysis of trends in partisanship in Western Europe on the 
one hand and attitudes of indifference and alienation on the other suggests that dealignment is 
indeed associated with indifference and alienation. The graphs illustrate that the rise of 
alienation and indifference coincides with the decline of partisanship. 
Having examined the levels of indifference and alienation in Western Europe, and 
their evolution more specifically, we find indications of European electorates becoming both 
more indifferent and more alienated over time.
4
 The evidence is strongest for alienation, 
however, with a significant increase in a larger number of countries and additionally a more 
pronounced overall increase than what holds for indifference. Previous research has offered 
indications that in Western Europe, the linkages between voters and parties have eroded over 
time (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002; Kayser and Wlezien, 2011). Our analyses suggest that 
this process of dealignment is compatible with a trend towards more indifference as well as 
with a growing alienation from political parties – although evidence is most convincing for 
alienation. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Explaining indifference and alienation 
 The aggregate level findings thus far suggest that alienation from the party system has 
grown more rapidly in European political systems than indifference towards the available 
options within the party system. To supplement these aggregate findings with individual level 
analyses, we investigate further the relation with partisanship. More specifically, we want to 
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determine how dealignment at an individual level – which we operationalize as being an 
apartisan – is related to indifference on the one hand and alienation on the other. To this end, 
we rely on regression analyses and estimate the impact of having a partisan identification on 
indifference and alienation respectively.  
 Before doing so, however, it is insightful to examine to what extent indifference and 
alienation are independent political attitudes. Examining how both attitudes correlate 
indicates a pearson correlation of 0.890 (p<0.000). To a large extent, hence, citizens with 
indifferent party preferences are also alienated from the parties at offer. The implication of 
this strong correlation is that there are hardly any citizens considering multiple parties when 
casting a vote who are not – in general – feeling rather negative about all parties. In practice, 
therefore, indifference and alienation are closely related empirically. To a large extent, this 
high correlation is also a consequence of our operationalization of indifference and alienation. 
When a person is highly alienated, as apparent from a low maximum PTV-value, the 
difference between her/his most and least preferred party will inevitably be smaller as well. In 
order to assess the impact of partisanship on one attitude correctly, it is therefore crucial to 
control for the other attitude as well. Explaining indifference we therefore control for the 
impact of alienation, and explaining alienation we control for the impact of indifference.  
 Even though indifference and alienation are correlated, we also want to be sure that 
they capture conceptually different attitudes towards the party system. More specifically, we 
would expect alienation to reflect a deprecatory attitude towards the political system, but 
indifference not – as this attitude only means that citizens take different parties into 
consideration when casting a vote. The results of some additional analyses reported in 
Appendix 3 show that this is indeed the case, as both concepts are related differently to 
fundamental attitudes toward the political system. Higher levels of alienation are significantly 
related to lower levels of political trust and less satisfaction with democracy – two attitudes 
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that are regularly looked at for assessing democratic legitimacy. For indifference, by contrast, 
we do not find a significant relation with these political attitudes. We can thus be confident 
that our operationalizations of indifference and alienation do indeed capture different 
theoretical constructs. Alienation is associated with more negative attitudes towards the 
political system (as it is negatively associated with levels of trust in politics and the extent to 
which one is satisfied with democracy), while this is not the case for indifference.  
Examining how partisanship relates to indifference and alienation, we start with basic 
models and progressively add more controls to examine the robustness of the results. In Table 
1, we first use indifference as a dependent variable (Models 1 to 4), and subsequently 
alienation (Models 5 to 8). Looking at the results of Model 1 in Table 1, we find that having a 
partisan identification is negatively associated with indifference. Identifying oneself with a 
political party – controlling for one’s level of alienation – is estimated to decrease one’s level 
of indifference, which ranges from 0 to 1, about 0.01 points. Including country (Model 2) and 
election (Model 3) dummies does not change the relation between partisanship and 
indifference. Finally, in Model 4, individual level background variables are added, but these 
too, do not seem to alter the relation we want to investigate.  
Turning now to alienation, the results of Model 5 indicate that having a partisan 
identification – controlling for one’s level of indifference – decreases a citizen’s level of 
alienation almost 0.02 points (on a 0 to 1-scale). The relation between partisanship and 
alienation is hence about double the size of the relation with indifference (as shown in Model 
1). Additionally controlling for differences in alienation between countries by the inclusion of 
country-dummies in Model 6 or by the inclusion of election-dummies in Model 7 hardly 
affects the estimated effects. Furthermore, the results of Model 8 illustrate that the results are 
robust to additionally controlling for the impact of socio-demographic variables and political 
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interest. Comparing the results of Model 4 with those of Model 8, the conclusion has to be 
that partisanship is much more strongly related to alienation than to indifference. 
 
[Table 1 about here]  
 
 The main conclusion to draw from the results presented in Table 1 is that partisanship 
is negatively associated both with indifference as with alienation. The size of the estimated 
effects, however, suggests a stronger relationship with alienation. The implication of this 
finding is that partisanship not only hinders an ‘open’ and indifferent attitude towards the 
party offer, but also prevents voters from becoming alienated towards the whole choice set of 
political parties. Dealignment – or the absence of partisanship – therefore, can be argued to 
allow for more open electorates, but more detrimentally leads to higher levels of alienation 
from party politics as well. 
 Having relied on a pooled sample of the datasets of the EES since 1989, one might 
wonder how the changed wording of the question gauging for partisanship affects our 
findings. As an additional test, we therefore investigated the impact of partisanship on 
indifference and alienation for each of the election studies separately. The results of these 
analyses are included in Appendix 4 and Appendix 5 and indicate that with the exception of 
the 2004 election, we consistently find partisanship to significantly decrease both indifference 
as well as alienation. Across the election studies, we furthermore and consistently observe the 
impact on alienation to be stronger than what holds for indifference. 
 Not only did we observe the increase of alienation in Western Europe to be more 
pronounced than what holds for indifference, the individual-level analyses indicate that 
partisanship is negatively associated mainly with alienation. Our analyses, however, are all 
based on the assumption that the relation between partisanship and attitudes of indifference 
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and alienation is constant over time. The more optimistic scholarly work on the consequences 
of dealignment, however, takes a different view and argues that the characteristics of 
apartisans have changed over time (Dalton, 2013). In this literature, it is claimed that while 
negative stereotypes of apartisans applied decades ago, these no longer hold for new 
generations of apartisans. These new generations of apartisans, it is argued, are highly 
sophisticated and politically engaged. Consequently, our findings on the relation between 
partisanship and indifference and alienation might conceal important over-time variation. 
More specifically, it might be that for the younger generations being an apartisan is related 
more strongly to indifference and less strongly to alienation. If so, our conclusion that 
dealignment most importantly is associated with a trend towards more political alienation 
might not hold for the ‘new’ apartisans entering the electorate and the link between 
partisanship and alienation might eventually be reversed. Even though the discontinuity in the 
phrasing of the party identity question prevents a longitudinal analysis on the pooled data, as 
an additional test we have – for each of the election samples separately – examined 
generational differences in the impact of partisanship on indifference and alienation. The 
results of these additional analyses
5
 are reported in Appendix 6 and do not show any 
indications of generational differences in the effect of partisanship on indifference and 
alienation respectively. There is no indication, therefore, that being apartisan would have 
different effects for more recent cohorts of voters as is claimed in this more optimistic line of 
the literature. 
 
Discussion 
 Across established democracies, electorates can no longer be characterized as ‘closed’ 
and voters are less and less attached to one particular political party. With feelings of ‘my 
party, right or wrong’ dissipating, the question rises what type of electorates have replaced 
  19 
these earlier closed electorates: open electorates, or electorates that are alienated from party 
politics? In this article we empirically investigate the extent to which dealignment 
corresponds to more open – indifferent – attitudes towards parties on the one hand and an 
attitude of alienation from parties on the other. We find indications that dealignment implies 
both strengthened feelings of indifference as well as more alienation.  
Importantly, however, results are clearly stronger for alienation. We demonstrate that 
feelings of alienation in Western Europe have increased more strongly than indifference. At 
an individual-level we furthermore observe partisanship to limit a sense of alienation more 
strongly than it hinders an attitude of indifference towards the parties at offer. The fact the 
findings of our longitudinal analysis at the aggregate level are in line with what the 
individual-level analyses of the impact of partisanship indicate, strengthens the reliability of 
our conclusions. Including an interaction effect with birth cohort does not support the 
assumption that this relation would be different among more recent birth cohorts. Our results 
indicate that dealignment does imply that electorates are becoming more ‘open’ to choose, as 
levels of indifference increase. This increased choosiness of voters, however, comes at a huge 
cost – a cost of growing levels of alienation from the party system.  
Nevertheless, our analyses have a number of limitations as well, most notably the 
change in question wording of the party identity question in the data set we used – which 
limits a full longitudinal analyses of partisanship or its impact on the pooled data. Further 
research, perhaps using other data sources, should investigate whether our conclusions hold 
when applying a real longitudinal analytical design. This is all the more important, as our 
work starts from an assumption of dealignment in advanced democracies. While our 
descriptive analyses indeed show indications of a trend towards decreasing levels of 
partisanship, we also observe important between-country variation in the extent to which 
partisanship decreases. In this context, we also have to acknowledge that there is still quite 
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some scholarly debate on this question – and this debate is particularly important in the 
United States (Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009). It would also be relevant for future research to use 
other questions (e.g., thermometer, or liking of a political party) to construct the indicators for 
indifference and alienation.  
Despite these limitations, we find clear indications that dealignment implies a more 
‘open’ attitude towards the parties. Our results, however, show that dealignment also – and 
even more strongly – is associated with a sense of alienation from parties. A number of 
scholars have optimistically described dealignment as a process that can bring about a 
democratic ideal of voters making well-thought-out vote choices. But even though we find 
indications of such a growing openness in the vote choices citizens make, our results indicate 
that dealignment is more of a double-edged sword, as the process also – and even more 
importantly – is related to a general alienation from the party system. This is not a minor 
issue, as the fact that dealigned voters have negative attitudes towards parties implies that the 
process of dealignment, can be thought to endanger the legitimacy of electoral and party 
politics in Western Europe. To the extent that citizens no longer feel close to one specific 
political party, it is likely that they will also develop a more negative attitude towards the 
party system as a whole. 
A large literature describes a process of dealignment in advanced democracies, and a 
number of publications are quite optimistic about the implications of weakening bonds 
between parties and voters. Dalton and Welzel (2014), for example, applaud the role played 
by new generations of assertive citizens. The results presented in this article lead to more 
concern about the implications of electoral dealignment. Given the importance of growing 
levels of alienation, the changes observed imply that a number of traditional linkage 
mechanisms between citizens and the political system that are being taken up mainly by 
political parties, will be weakened. While political parties traditionally are considered as the 
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main institution that is responsible for ‘making electoral democracy work’, apparently this 
function is weakened, which implies that other mechanisms are necessary if the representative 
character of electoral democracy is to be preserved. 
 
Endnotes 
1
. In the 2009 and 2014 EES voter surveys, respondents’ propensity to vote for each of the 
parties was measured on a scale from 0 to 10 instead of 1 to 10. To allow a comparison with 
the earlier 1-to-10-scales, the 0-to-10 scales were recoded, with 0 being recoded to 1, the 
values 1 and 2 both being 2 and all other values held constant. 
2
. Alternatively, we also perform analyses with partisan strength as a measure of dealignment 
(1 = no attachment, 2 = merely a sympathizer, 3 = fairly close, 4 = very close). This analysis 
resulted in basically the same results (see Appendix 3). 
3
. Theoretically, it could be expected that these effects are not the same in all of the cases that 
we investigate, but that they are dependent on characteristics of the election and the political 
system. In an additional analysis, we therefore also estimated random intercept models in 
which we included voter turnout, effective number of parties, and proportionality of the 
electoral system as characteristics of that specific election. None of these election-level 
variables was found to significantly affect indifference or alienation, however, and the 
individual-level estimates of this analysis showed no difference with the more parsimonious 
models reported in this article (results available from authors). 
4
. It is important to note that we also observe an increase in indifference and alienation when 
pooling the data. The general, European-wide, trend is thus one of growing levels of 
indifference and alienation. 
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5
. To examine this question we analyse the impact of birth cohorts – operationalized as 5-year 
intervals based on respondents’ year of birth and the interactive effect of birth cohorts and 
partisanship.
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Figure 1. Aggregate level trends: Partisanship and indifference in Western Europe (1989-2014) 
 
Note: Trends in partisanship (left axis) and indifference (right axis) over time. Sources: Eurobarometer trend file (1970-1994), ESS 2002-2014, EES combined datafile (1989-
2004), EES 2009 and EES 2014. For full information on levels of indifference in each election sample, see Appendix 1. Indifference =  (10 – ( max(PTVi) – min(PTVj≠i)))/10. 
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Figure 2. Aggregate level trends: Partisanship and alienation in Western Europe (1989-2014) 
 
Note: Trends in partisanship (left axis) and alienation (right axis) over time. Sources: Eurobarometer trend file (1970-1994), ESS 2002-2014, EES combined datafile (1989-
2004), EES 2009 and EES 2014. For full information on levels of alienation in each election sample, see Appendix 2. Alienation = (10 – max (PTVi))/10. 
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Table 1. Explaining indifference and alienation 
 Explaining Indifference Explaining Alienation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
B 
(s.e.) 
B 
(s.e.) 
B 
(s.e.) 
B 
(s.e.) 
B 
(s.e.) 
B 
(s.e.) 
B 
(s.e.) 
B 
(s.e.) 
Partisanship -0.009
*
 -0.011
***
 -0.012
***
 -0.008
***
 -0.018
***
 -0.017
***
 -0.024
***
 -0.023
***
 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Alienation 1.017
***
 1.016
***
 1.015
***
 1.016
***
     
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)     
Indifference     0.768
***
 0.767
***
 0.761
***
 0.762
***
 
     (0.026) (0.025) (0.016) (0.018) 
Female    0.003
*
    -0.007
***
 
    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Age    -0.000
***
    0.000 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Religious attendance    0.008
**
    -0.007
***
 
    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Social class    -0.011
**
    0.006
*
 
    (0.003)    (0.003) 
Political interest    -0.007
***
    -0.001 
    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Election FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.138
***
 0.150
***
 0.154
***
 0.189
***
 -0.059
***
 -0.072
***
 -0.085
***
 -0.088
***
 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
N 75,468 75,468 75,468 62,521 75,468 75,468 75,468 62,521 
R
2
 0.796 0.800 0.801 0.807 0.797 0.801 0.803 0.809 
Note: Results of regressions explaining alienation and indifference. Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors listed. Standard errors are robust for country clusters in 
Model 1 and Model 5 and robust for election clusters in Model 3, 4, 7 and Model 8. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Sources: EES combined datafile 
(1989-2004), EES 2009 and EES 2014.  
 
 
